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Abstract
This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the princi-
pal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority, or delegate
it to the agent, who has better information. An outside evaluator who forms the
principal's reputation cannot observe who makes the decision. The key feature of
this paper is that the principal can in°uence her reputation through her delegation
policy. With reputation concerns, we show that the principal tends to keep too
much the authority from the evaluator's point of view, even though sometimes her
information is not good enough for her to make the decision on her own.
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1\The buck stops here."
| Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the U.S.
1 Introduction
It is often said that some political leaders or CEOs are too aggressive in maintaining a
great deal of responsibilities. Why do they prefer to make the decision on their own, even
though their subordinates may do better? Research in behavioral economics emphasizes
that high-rank executives have the tendency to keep all the responsibilities due to their
overcon¯dence and overoptimism of the outcomes led by their actions or skills.1 However,
if they cares about the quality of the decision making, they should have a more competent
agent take more responsibilities. Thus, the important question that has been asked is:
\when and how much should the principal delegate the decision-making authority to the
agent?" and researchers have provided some good reasons for that.2 This paper tries to
analyze this issue in a di®erent direction: when the principal (she) has reputation concerns,
even though the agent (he) has better information in making the correct decision, a
principal may still want to keep the decision-making authority rather than delegate it
in order to manipulate her reputation. In other words, if the market or the outside
evaluator believes that all the decisions are done by her subordinate, the principal cannot
have any in°uence on her reputation through the decision making. Therefore, by making a
statement and a behavior such as \the buck stops here," or \I take the full responsibility,"
the principal should have the intention to increase her reputation.
Consider the situation where both the principal and the agent can be either good or
biased, which is private information to themselves. The principal wishes to be perceived
1For a survey, see Camerer and Malmendier (2007).
2The literature in political science has been paying much more attention to the optimal \degree of
delegation" in controlling the agency problem. For example, Epstein and O'Halloran (1994) show that
when Congress has appropriate administrative procedures, including ex ante delegation and ex post veto,
it delegates a large amount of authority, regardless of the di®erences in policy preferences. Epstein and
O'Halloran (1999) observe that Congress retains its authority the most in issues related to budgets, rules,
and ways and means, but delegates authority to the Executive the most in the areas of agricultural and
public works, and armed services. Gailmard (2002) introduces the bureaucrat's subversion into Epstein
and O'Halloran's (1999) model, which results in less delegation.
2as a good type, who has the same preference in the decision making as an outside evalu-
ator. The evaluator forms the reputation that enters the principal's utility function. For
example, in order to be reelected, a politician has the incentives to behave more account-
able, even though he may have his own interests. When the principal can determine the
allocation of authority, she can either make the decision on her own, or she can delegate
the decision making authority to the agent, who has better information regarding the
true state of the world. However, the agent may be biased and choose his preferred policy
which may not be appropriate for the true state. Importantly, the evaluator may not be
able to observe who makes the decision, and the reputation is formalized based on the
realized outcome regarding whether or not the decision is appropriate for the state, and
the belief regarding who the decision maker is. The main point here is that the principal
can manipulate her reputation through the delegation policy.
Consider a benchmark case where the allocation of authority is determined by the
evaluator, and the principal's type is public information. In this case, the allocation of
authority can be contingent on the principal's type. Then if the principal is good, the
evaluator prefers the agent's authority if the agent is more likely to be unbiased, or the
principal's information is su±ciently inaccurate. On the other hand, if the principal is
biased, the evaluator always prefers the agent's authority. This result basically resonates
the literature in the theory of delegation. When the principal has the control right to
determine the allocation of authority, we ¯rst consider the case where she has no reputa-
tion concerns. Then the good principal will choose the delegation policy which is also the
best for the evaluator, but the biased principal will always keep the authority. Therefore,
there is an e±ciency loss when the principal has the control right over the allocation of
authority, in the sense that the biased principal will abuse the control right and keep too
much the authority.
Consider the principal has reputation concerns when she determines the allocation of
authority. If the evaluator believes that it is more likely the principal who makes the
decision, the principal will be more responsible for the credit and blame in the decision
making. Thus, if the principal decides to keep the authority, the decision will in°uence
3her reputation more strongly. On the other hand, if the evaluator believes that it is more
likely the agent who makes the decision, her reputation is less sensitive to the decision
making, but the quality of decision making may be better if she decides to delegate the
authority. That is, the principal can utilize the delegation policy to manipulate both her
ex post reputation and the decision making.
Reputation concerns provide the good principal the incentives to keep excessive au-
thority from the evaluator's point of view. There occurs a so-called \stopping the buck"
phenomenon: when her information is su±ciently accurate, and the evaluator correctly
believes that she is responsible for the decision making, the principal tends to keep the
authority and make the right decision, in which way she can a®ect her reputation more
e®ectively because she has the con¯dence to do it right. On the other hand, the biased
principal prefers to keep the authority even without reputation concerns; but with rep-
utation concerns, she will choose the appropriate decision sometimes rather than always
choose her favorite policy. However, even though her decision making can be improved,
the evaluator still prefers the agent's authority when the principal's information is rel-
atively inaccurate. That is, both types of the principal tend to keep the authority too
often from the evaluator's point of view. Therefore, the principal's reputation concerns
lead to an ine±cient allocation of authority.
Our paper contributes to the theory of delegation, which has been an important issue in
organization theory. Aghion and Tirole (1997) point out that one reason for a principal to
delegate the authority to her agent is to take advantage of the agent's expertise. However,
since their interests do not align, the control cannot be perfect. The principal thus faces
a trade-o® between a loss of control and a loss of information in determining the optimal
allocation of decision-making authority. If the principal delegates the authority, the agent
has the incentive to acquire information, so that the quality of information can be better,
but the di®erence in preferences between them may still lead to a biased decision. When
communication between them is possible, Dessein (2002) obtains an interesting insight in
that delegation can always be better than any informative communication. Harris and
Raviv (2005) consider the case where the principal also has private information and show
4that the principal prefers delegation to communication when the agent's information is
relatively important. More recently, Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) study the socially
optimal allocation of a task (or tasks) between an elected politician and a bureaucrat who
has career concerns. In our paper, we allow the allocation of authority to be determined
by the principal instead by a social planner.
Our work is also closely related to Levy (2004) and Morris (2001), although delegation
is not an option in their models. Levy (2004) considers that the principal cares about
both the appropriate decisions and her reputation, and can consult with the agent before
making the decisions. She shows that the more competent the principal, the less she
will consult with the agent. In order to show that she is better than the agent, she will
take an action that contradicts the agent's advice, and thus in equilibrium, there will be
too many contradictions, i.e., the \anti-herding" behavior. Morris (2001) analyzes the
situation of \political correctness," which means that, in order to be distinguished from
the biased agent, the good agent has the tendency to recommend a policy that contradicts
to his information but may make him look good by suggesting it.3 Our paper also argues
that because of the reputation concerns, the good principal has the tendency to keep the
authority and make the right decision, even though sometimes her information suggests
that the agent should make the decision.
2 Model
There are three parties in this game: a principal, an agent, and an outside evaluator.
We can interpret the principal as a politician or a CEO, the agent as a bureaucrat or a
division manager, and the evaluator as the median voter or the stakeholder.
When the principal can determine the allocation of authority, she can either keep the
decision-making authority, or delegate the authority to the agent. The party who has the
decision-making authority chooses an action, x 2 f0;1g. The outcome depends on the
3Other researchers care about the agent's career concerns, which has been recognized as a reason for
information loss and ine±cient decision making. See, for example, Ottaviani and S¿rensen (2006), and
Scharfstein and Stein (1990).
5action and the state of the world, µ 2 f0;1g, where each state occurs with probability
1=2. We assume that the socially desirable, or appropriate, action from the evaluator's
point of view is characterized by x = µ. The principal can observe an informative but
noisy signal regarding the state of the world, which is denoted by s 2 f0;1g, where s = µ
with probability q 2 (1=2;1). The agent has better information than the principal, in
that he can receive the perfect signal, i.e. the realized µ. Moreover, the evaluator can
also observe the realized µ and the implemented action x; however, he may not be able to
observe the allocation of authority, the ex ante signals that the principal and the agent
receive, nor the principal's and agent's types.
The type of both the principal and the agent can be either good (unbiased) or biased,
in the sense that the good type prefers the appropriate decision, and the biased type
always prefers x = 1, when there are no reputation concerns.4 The type of the principal
and the agent is private information to themselves. There are, however, the common prior
beliefs that the principal is good with probability ¹p 2 (0;1) and biased with probability
1¡¹p, and that the agent is good with probability ¹a 2 (0;1) and biased with probability
1 ¡ ¹a. Accordingly, ¹p can be interpreted as the principal's ex ante reputation.
We assume that the principal receives a utility from both the action and her ex post
reputation, which is de¯ned as the evaluator's ex post belief about the principal being the
good type. Namely, the good principal's utility function is5
U
G
p (x;µ; ^ ¹p) = ¡jx ¡ µj + °^ ¹p; (1)
where ^ ¹p denotes the principal's ex post reputation and ° > 0 is its relative importance.
The biased principal, who intrinsically prefers x = 1, has the utility function:
U
B
p (x;µ; ^ ¹p) = ¡jx ¡ 1j + °^ ¹p: (2)
4Since the signal is informative here, a decision is \appropriate" if x = s, which of course may not be
\correct" ex post.
5 This could be derived from a two-period model: in the ¯rst period, a decision is made by the person
who has the authority. In the second period, observing the realized decision and the true state, the
evaluator forms the ex post reputation, and the principal receives a payo® from his reputation. This
treatment is similar to, for example, HolmstrÄ om and Ricart i Costa (1986) and Morris (2001).
6The agent has no reputation concerns. Thus, the good agent's utility function is
U
G
a (x;µ) = ¡jx ¡ µj; (3)
and the biased agent's utility function is
U
B
a (x;µ) = ¡jx ¡ 1j: (4)
Finally, the evaluator's utility function is Ue(x;µ) = ¡jx ¡ µj.
It can be seen that although the evaluator only cares about the correct decision making,
there is another role that he plays, which is not re°ected in his objective function: the
evaluator has to evaluate the posterior reputation of the principal, which enters her utility
function. This treatment is adapted by, for example, Levy (2004).
We assume that information regarding µ is soft so that the agent cannot verify it, and
the principal cannot elicit the agent's private information via some revelation mechanisms.
Furthermore, we assume that communication between the principal and the agent is costly
enough to prohibit information transmission between them through a cheap-talk game.
The only variable speci¯ed in the contract is the allocation of decision-making authority.
It is either the principal's authority, where the principal can decide x, or the agent's
authority, where the decision-making authority is delegated to the agent, and the principal
cannot overrule the agent's decision.
The timing of the game is as follows: (1) The principal chooses the allocation of
decision-making authority. (2) Under the principal's authority, the principal observes a
signal s. Under the agent's authority, the agent observes µ. (3) Given the allocation of
authority, the party who has the formal authority chooses x. (4) The evaluator observes
the realized µ and x, and updates the principal's reputation (from ¹p to ^ ¹p).
3 The Socially Determined Allocation of Authority
In this paper, the social welfare is evaluated from the evaluator's point of view. For the
evaluator, there are two main sources of ine±ciency in terms of the decision making: (i)
the principal's type is unknown to the evaluator; and (ii) the agent's type is unknown.
7Thus, if the principal has the authority, not only the biased principal intrinsically prefers
x = 1 which is inappropriate when s = 0, but the good principal may also distort
the decision making because of her reputation concerns. On the other hand, when the
authority is delegated to a biased agent, he always choose x = 1, which is wrong when
s = 0. Moreover, there can be additional ine±ciency in the allocation of authority for the
evaluator when the principal has the control right over the delegation policy, in that the
principal may allocate excessive authority to one of the parties.
In this section, we consider the benchmark case where the allocation of authority
is determined by the society or the evaluator, not by the principal. The evaluator can
know who the decision maker is and so there is no ine±ciency related to the principal's
delegation policy. We will analyze two cases: In the ¯rst case, the principal's type is
public information and therefore, she has no reputation concern. This also implies that
the allocation of authority can be contingent on the principal's type. In the second case,
the principal's type is private information, and thus, the principal can a®ect her ex post
reputation through the action she chooses. In either case, we will remain to assume that
the agent's type is private information as in the usual principal-agent model.
3.1 When the Principal's Type is Public Information
First of all, if the agent has the decision-making authority, it is obvious that the good
agent will choose x = µ, and the biased agent will choose x = 1 regardless of µ. As a
result, the evaluator's expected utility is ¡(1=2)(1¡¹a), which is the probability that the
agent is biased and makes wrong decision.
Next, consider that the principal has the authority. When the principal is a good type,
whose has the exactly same preference as that of the evaluator, she yields the evaluator
an expected utility of ¡(1 ¡ q), since the good principal makes the right decision with





so that the evaluator is indi®erent between the good principal's authority and the agent's
authority at q = ¹ q. Thus, the e±cient allocation of authority between a good principal
8and the agent has a simple form: the principal should have the authority if q ¸ ¹ q, and
the agent should have the authority otherwise, that is, the good principal should have
the authority if her information is su±ciently accurate. Moreover, since ¹ q is lower when
the probability of the agent being unbiased is lower, the good principal should have the
authority more likely when the agent is more likely to be biased.
On the other hand, suppose that the principal has the authority and she is biased
type. She will always choose x = 1, which yields the evaluator an expected utility of
¡1=2. Clearly, this is always less than that under the agent's authority, ¡(1=2)(1 ¡ ¹a).
We therefore have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the principal's type is public information and the allocation
of authority is determined to maximize the evaluator's welfare. Then:
1. if the principal is a good type, the evaluator prefers the principal's authority if and
only if q ¸ ¹ q, where ¹ q ´ (1 + ¹a)=2;
2. if the principal is a biased type, the evaluator always prefers the agent's authority.
This proposition echoes the previous literature, such as Aghion and Tirole (1997) and
Dessein (2002) regarding the reasons to delegate the decision-making authority to the
agent. If the principal is good, then the main trade-o® between the principal's and the
agent's authority is typically the loss of information versus the loss of control; that is, the
agent's authority is more preferable when the agent's information is relatively precise (q
is close to 1=2) and the agent's type is less likely biased (¹a is close to 1). However, if the
principal is biased, she always prefers a certain action, and so the evaluator prefers the
agent's authority because the agent has some chance to be good.
3.2 When Principal's Type is Private Information
In this case, the allocation of authority cannot be contingent on her type, so that the biased
principal actually has a chance to make the decision under the principal's authority. As
we will show later, because of her reputation concerns, the decision making by the biased
principal's can be partially improved.
9Principal's Authority
Under the principal's authority, the principal makes the decision based on the signal s
that she receives. With no reputation concerns, the good principal always chooses x = s,
and the biased principal always chooses x = 1. With reputation concerns, however, the
good principal may have the incentive to make a wrong decision in order to be distin-
guished from the biased one; that is, she may choose x = 0 when she observes s = 1.
On the contrary, the biased principal may choose x = 0 even when she observes s = 0,
in order to mimic the good type and enhance her reputation. This situation is similar
to the phenomenon of \political correctness" analyzed in Morris (2001), in which case a
good expert may try to send a recommendation that leads to a wrong action because of
signaling motivations.
There may exist many equilibria.6 In order to proceed with an interesting discussion
regarding how reputation concerns matter, we will focus on the equilibrium in which the
good principal always chooses x = s, and the biased one chooses x = 1 when s = 1, but
x = 0 with some probability when s = 0. One reason for the focus on this equilibrium
is that this case produces the most e±cient decision making for the evaluator, where the
good principal always chooses the appropriate policy, and the biased principal chooses
the appropriate decision with some positive probability, but not always, as will be seen
in what follows. The following assumption is made to ensure that such an equilibrium
exists:
Assumption 1. ° <
(2q¡1)(1¡¹pq)(1¡¹p(1¡q))
(1¡¹p)(1¡¹p+2¹pq(1¡q)) .
This assumption means that the level of the principal's reputation concerns is not too
large. Ideally, we wish reputation concerns to play an important, but not an overwhelming,
role in the analysis.7 Under this assumption, we characterize the equilibrium by means
of the following proposition:
6For example, the good principal may choose x = 0 when s = 1, in order to be distinguished from
the biased principal. However, we can show that among all the possibilities, the equilibrium that we are
focusing on can produce the best quality in decision making, which is the reason we call this the \most
e±cient" case. See the discussion in Section 5.
7If ° is too large, then reputation concerns will dominate and eliminate the incentives to make the
correct decision. Both types will choose whichever action that can render a higher reputation, so that
10Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, under the principal's authority,
there exists an equilibrium in which:
1. The good principal always chooses x = s.
2. The biased principal always chooses x = 1 if s = 1, and chooses x = 0 with proba-
bility º¤ < 1 if s = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand this result, at ¯rst we have to compute the ex post reputations, ^ ¹p(x;µ;º¤),
under this equilibrium. When the evaluator observes x and µ, based on the equilibrium


















¹p + (1 ¡ ¹p)º¤: (9)
We can show the following relationship:
^ ¹p(0;0;º
¤) = ^ ¹p(0;1;º
¤) ¸ ¹p ¸ ^ ¹p(1;1;º
¤) ¸ ^ ¹p(1;0;º
¤): (10)
The equalities hold if and only if º¤ = 1. When º¤ < 1, two implications can be drawn
from this relationship. First, taking the right action yields higher ex post reputation than
when taking the wrong action. Second, when choosing action x = 0, the principal renders
ex post reputation not only higher than that from x = 1, but also higher than her ex ante
reputation, even when it is a wrong policy. The e®ect is the opposite for the action x = 1.
This gives both principals the incentives to choose action x = 0 when they care about
reputation.
they either always take the same action when keeping the authority, or always delegate the authority
(which can happen when ° is large than 1=¹p). In this case, no matter whether the decision is made
correctly or not, the reputation is the same as the prior ¹p, and reputation concerns play no role.
11Therefore, in this equilibrium, since the good principal prefers action x = 0 if s = 0
without reputation concerns, she has even more incentives to select the appropriate action.
If s = 1, then she might wish to choose x = 0 because of the reputation concerns; however,
under Assumption 1, she will still choose x = 1. On the other hand, the biased principal
may choose x = 0 when s = 0, even though she prefers x = 1; however, she will not always
do so (i.e., º¤ < 1). The reason is simple. Given the good principal's appropriate decision-
making, if the biased principal chooses º¤ = 1, then the evaluator cannot distinguish the
good type from the biased one, which will reduce the ex post reputation to its prior level.
The biased type can then choose x = 1 without damaging her reputation (i.e. º¤ = 0),
which, however, cannot be consistent with the evaluator's belief. Therefore, it must be
the case that º¤ < 1.
Agent's Authority
As shown in the previous subsection, the evaluator's expected utility under the agent's
authority is ¡(1 ¡ ¹a)=2.
The Evaluator's Choice of Allocation of Authority
From the evaluator's view, the optimal decision is x = µ. When µ = 1, x = 1 is
implemented with probability 1 under the agent's authority, but with probability q+(1¡
q)(1¡¹p)(1¡º¤) under the principal's authority. Since the agent has better information,
the agent's authority is always better than the principal's authority when µ = 1. On the
other hand, when µ = 0, x = 0 is implemented with probability ¹a under the agent's
authority, and with probability q(¹p +(1¡¹p)º¤) under the principal's authority. In this
case, since the delegated agent may be biased, the principal's authority can be better than
the agent's authority even though the agent has more precise information. Therefore, the
evaluator faces a trade-o® between utilizing more precise information from the agent and
obtaining more appropriate decision making from the principal.





















(1 ¡ ¹a): (12)







¹p + (1 ¡ ¹p)º¤
¶
: (13)
Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, suppose that the principal's type is private infor-
mation and the allocation of authority is determined to maximize the evaluator's wel-
fare. Then the evaluator prefers the principal's authority if and only if q ¸ ^ q, where
^ q = [1+¹a=(¹p +(1¡¹p)º¤)]=2 and º¤ is the probability that the biased principal chooses
x = 0 when s = 0 in the equilibrium under the principal's authority.
Similar to Proposition 1, the evaluator prefers the agent's authority when the agent's
information is relatively precise (q is close to 1/2) or when the agent is more likely to be a
good type than the principal is (¹a is relatively larger than ¹p). Moreover, we o®er a new
factor regarding the principal's reputation concerns that can also a®ect the delegation
policy. With no reputation concerns, º¤ = 0 in equilibrium, so the evaluator prefers the
principal's authority if q ¸ (1+¹a=¹p)=2. Since the threshold ^ q is decreasing in º¤, repu-
tation concerns increase the rationality of the principal's authority: the evaluator prefers
the principal's authority more if the biased principal makes the appropriate decision more
likely. This result is summarized in the following remark:
Remark 1. Suppose that the principal's type is private information and the allocation of
authority is determined to maximize the evaluator's welfare. Then the principal's authority
is more preferable when the principal's reputation concerns are more important.8
It would be interesting to compare the result in the case of the principal's type be-
ing private information to that in the public information case. The following remark
summarizes the results in this section:
8When º¤ is interior, º¤ solves 1 = °
£
(1¡q)(^ ¹p(0;1;º¤)¡ ^ ¹p(1;1;º¤))+q(^ ¹p(0;0;º¤)¡ ^ ¹p(1;0;º¤))
¤
.
One can check that when ° is larger, º¤ is also larger. This implies that if ° is larger, the right-hand side
of equation (13) will be smaller, which follows that the principal's authority is more preferable.
13Remark 2. Suppose that the allocation of authority is determined to maximize the eval-
uator's welfare. Then when the principal's type is her private information, the evaluator
prefers the good principal to have the authority less likely, and the biased principal to have
the authority more likely, compared to the case where her type is known.
It is because ^ q > ¹ q, compared to the public information case, the evaluator prefers
the good principal to have the authority less likely, in the sense that the principal has
to be more accurate to have the authority. This is intuitive: because the principal's
type is unknown, under the principal's authority, the biased principal has a chance to
make the decision, which can be inappropriate sometimes. Thus, the evaluator prefers the
principal's authority less compared to that when he knows her type. This also implies that
the principal's private information leads to an e±ciency loss regarding the good principal's
allocation of authority. On the other hand, when the principal's type is unknown, the
biased principal, when she has the authority, will choose the appropriate action with some
probability due to her reputation concerns. This can improve e±ciency in terms of the
decision making. To see this, remember that in the known type case, the agent always
has the authority, which yields the evaluator an expected payo® of ¡(1¡¹a)=2. However,
in the unknown type case where the principal has the authority and she is indeed biased,
the evaluator's expected utility will be ¡[1¡º¤(2q ¡1)]=2. Thus, the evaluator is better
o® when the biased principal has the authority if and only if q ¸ [1+¹a=º¤]=2 (> ^ q). As
a result, if q or º¤ is su±ciently large, e±ciency can be improved under the principal's
authority when she is a biased type, but will decrease when she is a good type, and
therefore, the overall e®ect is ambiguous. Nevertheless, it can be seen that when º¤ or q
is su±ciently small, the evaluator's welfare in the known type case will certainly higher
than that in the unknown type case.
4 Principal's Delegation Policy
In this section, we consider the case where the principal can choose the allocation of
authority but the evaluator may not be able to observe it. Because of unobservability, the
14principal cannot a®ect her reputation directly through her delegation policy. Rather, the
evaluator has to form a belief in who actually makes the decision, and in equilibrium, this
belief must be consistent with the principal's choice of allocation. If the evaluator falsely
believes that the agent makes the decision while it is actually done by the principal,
the principal can use the delegation policy and the chosen decision to manipulate her
reputation, which would result in a higher payo® than in the equilibrium.
Namely, let ®G (resp. ®B) be the probability that the good (resp. the biased) principal
keeps the decision-making authority, and ^ ®G (resp. ^ ®B) is the evaluator's belief regarding
®G (resp. ®B). Thus, the evaluator believes that the decision-making authority belongs
to the principal with probability ¹p^ ®G + (1 ¡ ¹p)^ ®B, and to the agent with probability
1¡(¹p^ ®G +(1¡¹p)^ ®B). Denote (®G¤;®B¤) as the equilibrium pair, which should satisfy
the following two requirements:
1. For a given belief (^ ®G; ^ ®B), it is optimal for the good principal to keep the author-
ity with probability ®G¤, and for the biased principal to keep the authority with
probability ®B¤.
2. The evaluator's belief must be correct in the equilibrium. That is, (^ ®G; ^ ®B) is the
same as (®G¤;®B¤) in the equilibrium.9
In order to understand the e®ect of the principal's reputation concerns on her delega-
tion policy, we ¯rst consider the case when there is no reputation concern. The following
result is immediately:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the principal has no reputation concern and she can decide
the allocation of decision-making authority. Then the good principal will keep the authority
if and only if q ¸ ¹ q, and the biased principal will always keep the authority.
Proof. Since the good principal has the same preference as the evaluator, she will choose
the same one as in the socially determined case when the principal is known as a good
9In the de¯nition of our equilibrium concept, we assume that the evaluator will form a belief regarding
the principal's choice of mixed strategies. This is a direct application of the usual treatment in the
literature of career concerns, in which it is assumed that the evaluator will conjecture the player's choice
of a certain action (usually a pure strategy) and the belief is consistent with the actual one chosen on
the equilibrium path.
15type (i.e., Proposition 1). On the other hand, the biased principal always wants to choose
her favorite policy, x = 1. There is always a loss to her to delegate because there is a
chance that the agent may be good, so that x = 0 may be chosen.
This proposition shows the principal's intrinsic liking of the allocation of authority
when she has the control right over it. With no reputation concerns, the good principal
will never abuse her control right over the delegation policy, but the biased principal will
always abuse the control right by keeping the authority, and choose her most preferred
policy. This is obviously not e±cient because the evaluator prefers the agent's authority
if she knows the principal is biased. Therefore, even when there is no reputation concern,
letting the principal have the control right over the allocation of authority will lead to
some e±ciency loss since the biased type keeps too much the authority.
Now we consider the e®ect of the principal's reputation concerns on the delegation
policy. We will focus on the equilibrium which shares the same property as that analyzed
in the previous section: under the principal's authority, the good principal always chooses
x = s, and the biased principal always chooses x = 1 when s = 1, but chooses x = 0
with probability º when s = 0. Again, under the agent's authority, the good agent always
chooses x = µ and the biased agent always chooses x = 1. In this equilibrium, given
the realized µ and x, the evaluator's belief (^ ®G; ^ ®B), and the equilibrium strategy º, the
principal's ex post reputations ^ ¹p(x;µ;º; ^ ®G; ^ ®B) ´ ~ ¹p(x;µ;º) can be computed as follows:
~ ¹p(0;0;º) =
¹p[^ ®Gq + (1 ¡ ^ ®G)¹a]
¹p[^ ®Gq + (1 ¡ ^ ®G)¹a] + (1 ¡ ¹p)[^ ®Bqº + (1 ¡ ^ ®B)¹a]
; (14)
~ ¹p(1;1;º) =
¹p[^ ®Gq + (1 ¡ ^ ®G)]
¹p[^ ®Gq + (1 ¡ ^ ®G)] + (1 ¡ ¹p)[^ ®B(q + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ º)) + (1 ¡ ^ ®B)]
; (15)
~ ¹p(1;0;º) =
¹p[^ ®G(1 ¡ q) + (1 ¡ ^ ®G)(1 ¡ ¹a)]




¹p^ ®G + (1 ¡ ¹p)^ ®Bº
: (17)
The next proposition is the key result of this paper. We characterize the optimal del-
egation policy for both the good and the biased principals. Basically, the biased principal
has an incentive to mimic the good one, and the good principal wishes to be distin-
16guished. Interestingly, we show that both types of the principal will tend to keep the
decision-making right excessively, compared to the socially determined level.
Proposition 5. Consider the equilibrium where the good principal always chooses x = s,
and the biased principal always chooses x = 1 when s = 1, but x = 0 with probability º¤¤
when s = 0 under the principal's authority. Then the good principal keeps the authority
if and only if her signal is su±ciently accurate, and the biased principal always keeps the
authority. Both types keep too much the authority from the evaluator's point of view.
The proof is composed of three lemmas as follows. To be succinct, we denote by E(º¤¤)
the equilibrium pro¯le under the principal' authority in which the good principal always
chooses x = s, and the biased principal always chooses x = 1 when s = 1, but x = 0 with
probability º¤¤ when s = 0.
4.1 The Good Principal's Delegation Policy
As stated before, when the principal's type is known as a good type, the society prefers
her to have the authority if and only if q ¸ ¹ q, where ¹ q is the critical value de¯ned in (5),
which is also the best delegation policy when she has no reputation concerns. However,
when she has reputation concerns, her delegation policy is a®ected by the relative bene¯ts
between making the correct decision and her reputation. The following lemma and Figure
1 characterize the good principal's delegation policy.
Lemma 1. Given E(º¤¤), the good principal chooses ®G¤ = 1 if and only if q ¸ ~ q, where
¹a · ~ q · ¹ q.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the evaluator believes that the good
principal is very likely to keep the authority, the principal will be more responsible for
the credit and blame from the decision making. Since the agent may be biased with some
probability, delegation (given that the evaluator believes the principal is in charge) can
hurt her ex post reputation seriously if a wrong policy is implemented. However, if her
171




Figure 1: The good principal's equilibrium ®G¤
information is su±ciently precise, the good principal has the con¯dence to make the right
decision, and therefore she prefers to keep the authority so that she can in°uence her
reputation more e®ectively. Thus, the evaluator's belief is con¯rmed in equilibrium. On
the contrary, if the principal's information is less precise, and the evaluator believes that
it is more likely that the agent has the authority, the ex post reputation is indeed close
to the prior belief, and thus cannot be a®ected signi¯cantly by the principal's decision
making. Hence, it is more important for the good principal to make the right decision
than to increase her reputation, and so she prefers delegation. Again, this will con¯rm
the evaluator's belief in equilibrium.
The idea behind the proof is based on the fact that the gains in the ex post reputa-
tions from choosing action x = 0, ~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º) and ~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;0;º), are
increasing in ^ ®G at q = ¹ q > ¹a. Because the biased principal always has some chance to
choose action x = 1, this increases the good principal's incentive to keep the authority
and choose the action x = 0 in order to be distinguished from the biased one. However,
it can be bene¯cial only if the evaluator believes that the good principal is very likely to
keep the authority and the information is accurate enough.
From this result, we can see that if the principal can decide the delegation policy,
since ~ q · ¹ q, the principal's reputation concerns result in the authority being excessively
allocated to the principal, in the sense that, compared to the case where the allocation is
18socially determined and her type is known, or to the case where the delegation policy is
determined by the principal but she has no reputation concerns, the level that she keeps
the authority is greater than the optimal one from the evaluator's point of view.
This interesting result is related to the \political correctness" phenomenon addressed
by Morris (2001), in that a good principal has the incentives to choose the \appropri-
ate" decision too often in order to be distinguished from the biased type. Likewise, a
phenomenon of \stopping the buck" happens in this paper: when the good principal has
accurate enough information, she has a strong incentive to keep the authority and make
the right decision because she has the self con¯dence. However, this indeed leads to some
e±ciency loss from the evaluator's point of view, because sometimes the information the
principal possesses is not accurate enough for her to make the decision on her own.
4.2 The Biased Principal's Delegation Policy
The next lemma describes the biased principal's optimal delegation policy.
Lemma 2. Given E(º¤¤), the biased principal always chooses ®B¤ = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma states that the biased principal always keeps the authority in the equi-
librium. The intuition is as follows. According to the ex post reputations de¯ned in
(14)-(17), by two ways the biased principal can increase the gain in reputation when
choosing x = 0 (or the cost from choosing x = 1): he can either delegate the authority
more likely (i.e., a lower ^ ®B), or keep the authority but decrease the probability of making
the appropriate decision (i.e., a lower º). However, there is another cost from delegation:
with probability ¹a that the agent is good, a preferred action x = 1 will not be chosen
if the biased principal delegates the authority. As we have seen in Proposition 4, even
without reputation concerns, the biased principal has the tendency to keep the author-
ity. Therefore, she would rather keep the authority and choose the appropriate decision
sometimes than delegate the authority.
19However, compared to the case where the principal's type is public information and
the allocation of authority is socially determined, in which case the biased principal never
has the authority, the biased principal will keep too much the authority. To see this, ¯rst
note that in contrast to known type case, the biased principal may choose the appropriate
decision sometimes when s = 0, which means that the quality of decision making is
improved. In this case, the evaluator's expected utility under the principal's authority
will be ¡[1 ¡ º¤¤(2q ¡ 1)]=2 for a given º¤¤, and that under the agent's authority is
¡(1¡¹a)=2. Thus, the evaluator prefers the biased principal to keep the authority if and
only if q ¸ [1 + ¹a=º¤¤]=2 (> ¹ q ¸ ~ q). That is, the biased principal should delegate the
authority to a greater extent than the good principal does. However, according to this
lemma, the biased principal will always keep the authority in equilibrium, and so even
though the decision making made by the biased principal can be improved, she still keeps
too much the authority from the evaluator's point of view.
4.3 The Principal's Decision Making
The following lemma considers the principal's optimal decision making, which is charac-
terized by E(º¤¤).
Lemma 3. Suppose that the good principal chooses ®G¤ = 1 if and only if q > ~ q, and that
the biased principal always chooses ®B¤ = 1. Then, if Assumption 1 holds, there exists an
equilibrium E(º¤¤).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma states that, given the delegation policies described in Lemmas 1 and 2,
the equilibrium pro¯le E(º¤¤) does exist. The idea is to show that choosing action 0 still
renders higher ex post reputations. Under Assumption 1, the good principal will always
choose the appropriate action, and the biased principal will choose the appropriate action
when s = 1, but only with some probability º¤¤ when s = 0. We can see that, compared
to Proposition 4, the good principal's decision making has no di®erence, but the biased
20principal's decision making can be improved due to her reputation concerns, because she
may choose x = 0 with some probability when s = 0.
To sum up, comparing Proposition 5 with Propositions 1 and 4, we ¯nd that:
1. Reputation concerns provide the good principal the incentives to keep too much the
authority.
2. The biased principal prefers to keep the authority even without reputation concerns,
but with reputation concerns, her decision making can be improved. However, even
so, the biased principal still keeps too much the authority.
It is also interesting to compare the results in this section to that in section 3.2, where
the allocation of authority is socially determined but the principal's type is unknown.
The principal has reputation concerns in both situations; the only di®erence is whether or
not the evaluator can observe who makes the decision. If the principal can determine the
allocation of authority, her choice of delegation policy can somehow re°ect the informa-
tion regarding her type, and therefore, the allocation of authority may be more e±cient
compared to the case where the evaluator cannot observe the type of the principal. How-
ever, as we mentioned before, letting the principal have the control over the allocation
of authority has already caused some loss in e±ciency. In fact, comparing Proposition 5
with Proposition 3, the conclusion is ambiguous in terms of the e±ciency in the allocation
of authority.
In terms of the decision making, we have the following remark:
Remark 3. º¤¤ · º¤.
This remark claims that, compared to the case where the allocation of authority is
determined by the evaluator, the probability that the biased principal will choose x = 0
when s = 0 becomes smaller. The reason for this is that, according to Proposition 5, the
good principal will sometimes delegate the authority, and therefore the cost (i.e. the loss
in ex post reputation) from choosing x = 1 to the biased principal will decrease because
the blame is partially shifted to the biased agent. Thus, compared to the case where
the evaluator knows (or believes) that it is the principal who makes the decision (i.e.,
21^ ®G = ^ ®B = 1), the biased principal has a weaker incentive to choose the appropriate
decision when s = 0. In particular, if the evaluator believes that the good principal
always delegates the authority (i.e., ^ ®G = 0), the biased principal will always choose
x = 1 (º¤¤ = 0) when she keeps the authority, in which case she will completely share the
blame with the agent. Behaving more appropriately or masquerading the good principal
will not a®ect her reputation, so that she will become completely biased when s = 0.
This result can be interpreted as a example of \passing the buck." When the evaluator
knows that it is the principal who makes the decision, the principal will take all the
credit or blame. So if she chooses her preferred policy, it may hurt her reputation badly,
and thus she will behave more appropriately. However, if the evaluator cannot observe
the allocation of authority, as long as the evaluator believes that she is not completely
responsible for the decision and outcome, she can partially shift the blame to the agent,
who has some probability of being biased, and can therefore be in a better position to
choose her ideal policy.
5 Extensions
5.1 Observable Allocation of Authority
In this paper, it is assumed that the evaluator cannot observe who the decision maker
is. If instead, the allocation of authority can be observable by the evaluator, then the
delegation policy becomes a signaling device regarding the type of the principal. In this
case, the principal's reputation is updated based on two signals: the quality of decision
making and the choice of delegation.
It is possible that the evaluator only use one of the signals. If he only considers the
delegation policy as the signal, then the game becomes a typical signaling game. In this
case, we can show that there are two types of equilibria. When the reputation concerns
are large, then the equilibrium is a pooling one: both types delegate the authority. When
the reputation concerns are intermediate, the equilibrium is a semi-separating one: the
biased principal always keeps the authority and the good principal keeps the authority
22only with some probability. The latter case is indeed similar to the case in Section 4,
and it remains valid that both types of the principal keep too much the authority. If the
evaluator use both signals, then we need to consider a multi-dimensional signaling game.
The complete analysis is beyond the scope of the paper.
5.2 Other Equilibria
Under Assumption 1, in addition to the one described in Proposition 2, there may exist
another non-pooling equilibrium where: (1) the good principal chooses x = 0 if s = 0
with probability 1, and x = 1 if s = 1 with probability º¤
G < 1; and (2) the biased
principal chooses x = 1 if s = 1 with probability 1, and x = 0 if s = 0 with probability
º¤
B < 1. There is no other non-pooling equilibrium.10 Therefore, the good principal may
sometimes make the wrong decision on purpose, which is similar to the situation raised in
Morris (2001). In terms of the quality of decision making, the one proposed in Proposition
2 is apparently more e±cient than any other.
When other equilibria are under consideration, for example, when Assumption 1 is
relaxed so that the principal has a larger reputation concern, the ex post reputations
become less sensitive to whether the policy is right or wrong. In this case, we think that
there remains a tendency to retain too much authority, because the principal, especially
the good type, can manipulate their reputations both through delegation policy and
decision making (i.e., ºG).
5.3 The Agent's Reputation Concerns
So far, the agent basically plays no important role in the analysis. In the case where the
agent also has reputation concerns, the biased agent may choose the right decision when
he is delegated. Delegation becomes better for the decision making and so the principal
may delegate the authority more likely. However, there may occur another distortion in
the good agent's decision making, because he wants to be distinguished from the biased
10The proof is available upon request.
23agent. The analysis will certainly become much more complicated but is worth of pursuing
in the future.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate how the principal allocates the decision-making authority
when she has reputation concerns. We argue that the principal keeps too much the au-
thority from the evaluator's point of view. Especially, there occurs a so-called \stopping
the buck" phenomenon: when her information is su±ciently accurate, the good princi-
pal will try to keep the authority and make the right decision rather than delegate the
authority to the agent, even though sometimes from the evaluator's point of view, her
information is not accurate enough to make the decision on her own.
Our attention is restricted to some speci¯c equilibrium in which the good principal
always chooses the right policy. A more general analysis of the optimal delegation policy
with all possible equilibria may be called for. In particular, the good principal may have
an incentive to choose a wrong decision in order to di®erentiate herself from the biased
one. However, our haunch is that the tendency to retain too much authority still remains.
A general model that incorporates the agent's reputation concerns or delegation policy as
a signaling device is also interesting and worth pursuing.
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25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is composed of the following Lemmas 4 and 5:
Lemma 4. Suppose that the biased principal chooses x = 1 when s = 1, and x = 0 with
probability º¤ < 1 when s = 0. Then, under Assumption 1, the good principal always
chooses x = s.
Proof. When s = 0, if the good principal chooses x = 0, she obtains 1
2q°^ ¹p(0;0;º)+ 1
2(1¡
q)[¡1 + °^ ¹p(0;1;º)]. If she instead chooses x = 1, she obtains 1
2q[¡1 + °^ ¹p(1;0;º)] +
1
2(1 ¡ q)°^ ¹p(1;1;º). Then according to (10) and q > 1=2, it is easy to see that she will
always choose x = 0.
When s = 1, if the good principal implements x = 0, then her expected utility becomes
1
2q[¡1 + °^ ¹p(0;1;º)] + 1
2(1 ¡ q)°^ ¹p(0;0;º). If she chooses x = 1 instead, her expected
utility is 1
2q°^ ¹p(1;1;º) + 1
2(1 ¡ q)[¡1 + °^ ¹p(1;0;º)]. Then if
2q ¡ 1 ¸ °
£
q(^ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;1;º)) + (1 ¡ q)(^ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;0;º))
¤
; (A.1)
she will choose x = 1. According to (6)-(9), ^ ¹p(1;0;º) and ^ ¹p(1;1;º) are increasing in º,
and ^ ¹p(0;1;º) and ^ ¹p(0;0;º) are decreasing in º. Thus, if º = 0, ^ ¹p(0;1;º)¡^ ¹p(1;1;º) and





respectively. Thus, under Assumption 1, and q > 1=2, (A.1) is satis¯ed.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the good principal always chooses x = s. Then, under Assump-
tion 1, the biased principal always chooses x = 1 if s = 1, and x = 0 with probability
º¤ 2 [0;1) if s = 0.
Proof. Suppose that s = 1 is observed. If the biased principal chooses x = 1, she obtains
1
2q°^ ¹p(1;1;º) + 1
2(1 ¡ q)°^ ¹p(1;0;º). If she instead chooses x = 0, she obtains 1
2q[¡1 +
°^ ¹p(0;1;º)] + 1
2(1 ¡ q)[¡1 + °^ ¹p(0;0;º)]. Thus, she chooses x = 1 if
1 ¸ °
£
q(^ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;1;º)) + (1 ¡ q)(^ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;0;º))
¤
: (A.2)
Note that (A.1) implies (A.2). Thus, the biased principal will always choose x = 1 if
s = 1.
Suppose that s = 0 is observed. If she chooses x = 1, then her expected utility
becomes 1
2q°^ ¹p(1;0;º) + 1
2(1 ¡ q)^ ¹p(1;1;º). If she chooses x = 0, her expected utility is
261
2q[¡1 + °^ ¹p(0;0;º)] + 1
2(1 ¡ q)[¡1 + °^ ¹p(0;1;º)]. If
1 < °
£
(1 ¡ q)(^ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;1;º)) + q(^ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;0;º))
¤
;
she will always choose x = 0, i.e. º = 1. However, if so, all the posterior beliefs are
equal to ¹p, so that the above inequality cannot hold. Therefore, it must be the case that
º¤ < 1. That is,
1 ¸ °
£
(1 ¡ q)(^ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;1;º)) + q(^ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ^ ¹p(1;0;º))
¤
(A.3)
must hold in equilibrium, which is always satis¯ed under Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. Before proceeding our analysis, we ¯rst note that the following
important relationships have to be satis¯ed for the equilibrium E(º) to be supportable:
~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¸ ¹p ¸ ~ ¹p(1;0;º) and ~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¸ ¹p ¸ ~ ¹p(1;1;º): (A.4)
If (A.4) does not hold, the good principal may choose x = 1 even when s = 0 when she
has the authority, which is not the equilibrium we are focusing on. (A.4) will hold if
^ ®
G(q ¡ ¹a) ¸ ^ ®
B(qº ¡ ¹a) and ^ ®
G ¸ ^ ®
Bº: (A.5)
In the following proofs, we will compute the principal's payo®s based on the belief (^ ®G; ^ ®B)
and º that satisfy (A.5), and then verify that the equilibrium (®G¤;®B¤) indeed can satisfy
(A.5).
Proof of Lemma 1. Given the evaluator's belief (^ ®G; ^ ®B), if the good principal keeps























Thus, the good principal keeps the authority if and only if
2q ¡ 1 ¡ ¹a + °
©
(q ¡ ¹a)[~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;0;º)]




27There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that q < ¹a. Then (A.8) can be
rewritten as (q¡¹a)f1+°[~ ¹p(0;0;º)¡~ ¹p(1;0;º)]g¡(1¡q)f1¡°[~ ¹p(0;1;º)¡~ ¹p(1;1;º)]g,
which is always negative according to (A.4) and Assumption 1. This implies that, the
good principal will always delegate the authority when q < ¹a.
Now suppose that q ¸ ¹a. Since both ~ ¹p(0;0;º)¡~ ¹p(1;0;º) and ~ ¹p(0;1;º)¡~ ¹p(1;1;º)
are positive according to (A.4), when q ¸
1+¹a
2 = ¹ q, the left-hand side of (A.8) is positive
(since 2q ¡ 1 ¡ ¹a ¸ 0), and so she will keep the authority with probability 1.
According to the following Lemma 2, in equilibrium, ®B¤ = 1 . Thus, the evaluator's
belief must be ^ ®B = 1. Based on this belief, for any ^ ®G, we can show two facts: (i)
~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;0;º) is increasing in q, and ~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º) is decreasing in q;
(ii) ~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;0;º) is always larger than ~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º). These two facts
imply that the left-hand side of (A.8) is increasing in q.
Moreover, one also can check that ~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º) is increasing in ^ ®G, and if
q ¸ ¹a, ~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;0;º) is also increasing in ^ ®G. Suppose that (A.8) holds as an
equality when ^ ®G = 1. Then, when the evaluator believes ^ ®G < 1, the left-hand side is
smaller than 0 given the same º, which further implies that ®G¤ < 1.
According to the above analysis, we can conclude that there exists a ~ q, where ¹ q ¸ ~ q ¸
¹a, such that the good principal with q > ~ q will keep the authority with probability 1,
and with q · ~ q she will delegate the authority with some positive probability. Namely,
~ q is the type where (A.8) holds as an equality when ^ ®G = 1, that is, the type who is
indi®erent in keeping and delegating the authority.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given the evaluator's belief (^ ®G; ^ ®B), the biased principal's expected
























If ®B¤ = 1, then it must be the case that
¹a
©











28Now consider the biased principal's decision regarding º. Suppose that the biased
principal receives a signal s = 0. If she chooses x = 1, then her expected utility becomes
1
2q°~ ¹p(1;0;º) + 1
2(1 ¡ q)~ ¹p(1;1;º). If she chooses x = 0, her expected utility is 1
2q[¡1 +
°~ ¹p(0;0;º)]+ 1




(1 ¡ q)(~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º)) + q(~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;0;º))
¤
: (A.12)
In other words, ºf1 ¡ °
£
q(~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;0;º)) + (1 ¡ q)(~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º))
¤
g ·
0 (including the case º = 0), which is the second term in (A.11). Also according to
Assumption 1, the ¯rst term in (A.11) is always positive. Therefore, given any belief
(^ ®G; ^ ®B) that satis¯es (A.5), the left-hand side of (A.11) is always positive, that is, (A.11)
holds. It follows that ®B¤ = 1.
It remains to show that the equilibrium (®G¤;®B¤) can also be a correct belief by
the evaluator. That is, (^ ®G; ^ ®B) = (®G¤;®B¤) must satisfy (A.5). When ®G¤ = 0, since
®B¤ = 1, (A.5) is satis¯ed only when º¤¤ = 0. This is true according to following Lemma
3. When ®G¤ = 1 (which occurs when q ¸ ~ q ¸ ¹a), then (A.5) is obviously satis¯ed since
º¤¤ < 1. If 0 < ®G¤ < 1, in which case the principal is indi®erent between keeping and
delegating the authority, then (A.5) is satis¯ed as long as º¤¤ · ®G¤. Since ®G¤ is free to
choose (while º¤¤ is determined by (A.12) holding as an equality), there must exist some
®G¤ so that it is true. Therefore, (®G¤;®B¤) can constitute as an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3 and Remark 3. We can apply the similar methodology of Propo-
sition 2 to Lemma 3 and show that there exists an equilibrium E(º¤¤) under Assumption
1.
To prove Remark 3, we ¯rst note that º¤ corresponds to the solution where ^ ®G = ^ ®B =
1 (i.e. when the evaluator believes that the principal always keeps the authority), and that
if 1 > º¤ > 0, º¤ solves °
£




We notice that ~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º) is increasing in ^ ®G, and if q ¸ ¹a, ~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡
~ ¹p(1;0;º) is increasing in ^ ®G as well. Suppose that q ¸ ¹a. Since now ^ ®G · 1, the
gain in the reputation is smaller than that in the previous section, given the same º. In
particular, since the value on the right-hand side of (A.12) is decreasing in º, this implies
that º¤¤ · º¤ when q ¸ ¹a.
29Suppose that q < ¹a. Then according to Lemma 1, ®G¤ = 0 in equilibrium. Thus,
we can impose ^ ®G = 0 and ^ ®B = 1 into (A.12). The right-hand side is always less than
1 if º¤¤ = 0, according to Assumption 1. Since ~ ¹p(0;1;º) ¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º) and ~ ¹p(0;0;º) ¡
~ ¹p(1;0;º) are both decreasing in º, 1 > °
£
(1¡q)(~ ¹p(0;1;º)¡ ~ ¹p(1;1;º))+q(~ ¹p(0;0;º)¡
~ ¹p(1;0;º))
¤
is always the case for any º > 0. It follows that the biased principal will
choose º¤¤ = 0 when ^ ®G = 0. This is also the only case that can satisfy (A.5).
30